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Chile: academic performance 
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Ricardo D. Paredes and Valentina Paredes
W orking with census information on standardized academic 
performance tests and using different estimation techniques, this article 
analyses sociodemographic and management factors affecting the 
performance of Chile’s municipal schools. The evidence suggests that 
the system’s lack of flexibility, particularly where teacher dismissal is 
concerned, is an important factor but not the main cause of poor academic 
performance. Conversely, the differences in academic performance between 
municipal schools that can be attributed to management are almost 
twice the standard deviation of the System for Measuring the Quality of 
Education (simce) performance test and 20 times the increment ascribed 
to the “complete school day” initiative, which costs the equivalent of half 














Catholic University of Chile
and Centre for Research on





University of California, Berkeley 
✒ vparedes@econ.berkeley.edu
118
ChiLE: ACADEMiC PErForMAnCE AnD EDuCAtionAL MAnAGEMEnt unDEr A riGiD 
EMPLoyMEnt REgIME  •  RICARDo D. PAREDEs AnD VALEntInA PAREDEs
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 9  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 9
Primary education performs poorly in Chile. This is 
particularly striking because the country has not only 
been channelling significant resources into education, 
but has also implemented major reforms in the sector. 
Despite all these efforts, performance indicators have 
remained virtually unchanged.
A question that is becoming increasingly vital 
all over the world, but particularly in Latin America, 
is whether differences in educational performance 
are due to the different institutional mechanisms 
governing schools and whether decentralization and 
certain forms of privatization may account for them. 
In Chile, the first country to implement major reforms, 
municipal schools take in more than 50% of primary 
students but obtain substantially lower scores than 
other types of school. A recurrent explanation for the 
underperformance of these schools is that, as well as 
taking in more vulnerable students, they are subject to 
a very rigid regulatory framework regarding teacher 
dismissal and salaries.
In this study we analyse the importance of the 
Teaching Statute (Estatuto Docente) and other factors 
in addition to that legislation, which lays down the 
principles regulating the operations of the education 
sector in municipal districts. The effects of management 
on performance are a particular interest of this paper, 
which is divided into four sections. Section II briefly 
reviews the literature and describes the institutional 
characteristics of  municipal schools. Section III 
estimates measures of municipal school performance 
and introduces a set of management variables. Section 
IV concludes with recommendations.
  The authors are grateful to the Ministry of Education for the 
simce data, to the National Fund for Scientific and Technological 
Development (fondecyt) for its financing of project 1,095,176, 
Centre for Research on Educational Policy and Practice (cie01-
conicyt) and to Rómulo Chumacero. They also wish to express 





the Chilean education system
1.  the institutional framework
Until the late 1970s, the Ministry of  Education 
was responsible for financing public education in 
Chile, regulating curricular content and investing 
in infrastructure. Negotiations with teachers were 
centralized, something that was deemed to be a source 
of conflict and regional inequity. The reform of 1980 
sought to change this situation, reflected as it was 
in the low quality of education, high repetition and 
drop-out rates, low investment and a lack of incentives 
(Hanushek, 1998).
One of  the main tools of  the reform was the 
introduction of  incentives, which involved market 
elements, targeted expenditure and, in particular, 
certain forms of privatization and decentralization. 
Three categories of schools were created as a result: (i) 
municipal schools, administered by the municipalities 
and financed by a government subsidy based on 
attendance per student and municipal contributions; 
(ii) subsidized private schools, also financed by the 
State with the same attendance subsidy per student 
and, since 1992, by additional contributions made 
within certain limits by parents; and (iii) fee-paying 
private schools, financed exclusively from parents’ 
contributions. A detailed description can be found 
in Mizala and Romaguera (1998).1
In 1988, the System for Measuring the Quality 
of Education (simce) test was created. It consists of 
four parts that measure knowledge of content from 
1 A minority of  municipal schools operate under municipal 
corporations (corporaciones municipales), which have some degree 
of financial autonomy and greater latitude to determine salaries 
and the employment regime of workers in educational management 
support roles.
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the present and the past: language and communication 
(language), mathematical studies (mathematics), study 
and understanding of nature (science) and study and 
understanding of  society (social studies). The test 
is taken at the end of the school year. While widely 
accepted, the simce, like most other standardized 
tests, has come in for considerable criticism (see, for 
example, Eyzaguirre and Fontaine, 1999). 
The results of this standardized test have been 
made public since 1995 to give parents a tool with 
which to judge the performance of their children and 
to foster competition between schools. This test has 
been the main instrument for measuring the quality 
of education in the country and the authors have used 
it as their primary information source. In 1998, it was 
modified and standardized so that it could be used to 
follow up school performance. The new test has an open-
ended scale that measures student abilities (cognitive 
skills). It uses item response theory (irt), a procedure 
linking students’ scores to aptitudes that is applied 
in most international tests of academic attainment, 
such as the Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study (timss) and the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (pisa). Thus, even 
if  two students answer the same number of questions 
correctly, their scores could differ as different levels of 
aptitude are being measured. The simce 2000 scores, 
with a mean of 250 points and a standard deviation 
of  50 points, serve as a benchmark against which 
eighth grade results (including the 2004 results used 
in this study) are compared.
In 1991, Chile enacted the Teaching Statute, 
which provided for centralized pay bargaining 
and protected teachers at municipal schools from 
dismissal, and thus made the system even more 
inflexible (Tokman, 2004; Beyer, 2001). In 1996, 
the National System for the Evaluation of  School 
Performance (sned) was introduced. This programme 
requires schools to provide information on educational 
processes and results, and establishes incentives for 
teachers (Mizala and Romaguera, 1999 and 2000a). 
In 2007, the government finished implementing the 
complete school day initiative, increasing the primary 
school week from 30 to 38 hours and the secondary 
school week from 36 to 42 hours. This initiative was 
based on a curricular reform which changed study 
plans and programmes and laid down minimum 
compulsory syllabuses.
Regarding the consequences of the reforms, they 
are generally agreed to have increased coverage and 
reduced repetition rates. However, most analysts also 
find that education quality is low, that educational 
results are highly stratified and that the level of 
instruction is unsatisfactory by international standards 
(Heyneman, 1991 and 2004; Bellei and González, 
2002; Brunner, 2005; Valenzuela, 2008; Paredes and 
Ruiz, 2009). The Third International Mathematics 
and Science Study-Repeat (timss-r), for instance, 
shows that in 1999 Chilean eighth grade students 
ranked 35 among 38 countries in mathematics and 
science, while in 2003 they ranked 40 out of 45 in 
mathematics and 37 out of 45 in science. Chile even 
ranks below countries with lower per capita gross 
domestic product (gdp) and investment in education, 
such as Jordan and Malaysia. Furthermore, the 2003 
timss-r showed that the gap in quality between the 
low- and high-income sectors had increased between 
1990 and 2003 from 120 to 142 points on a scale 
having a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 
100. Tokman (2004) arrives at similar conclusions on 
the basis of other international tests, namely pisa, the 
International Adult Literacy Survey (ials) (Hanushek 
and Kimko, 2000) and timss.
Besides the relative underperformance of low-
income groups, Chilean students also perform badly 
on average. Figure 1 shows these two situations. On 
the standardized simce scale, a score below 226 
means that the student has not even assimilated the 
content of the courses preceding the year in which he 
or she sat the examination. A score of between 227 
and 267 shows that the student has partial mastery 
of the preceding courses but has not assimilated the 
content of the course currently being taken. This is 
especially important considering that the simce is 
taken at the end of the year.
There is a large literature on the consequences of 
these reforms. The broad consensus is that coverage has 
increased substantially over the last 15 years but that 
the reforms have done little to reduce the educational 
gap between households by income level or to improve 
the absolute quality of  education. There has been 
less analysis of the role of school municipalities and 
of the effects of the Teaching Statute on academic 
performance (Paredes and Lizama, 2006).
2. Assessing municipal education
Most studies on Chile have treated socio-economic 
factors as determinants of  educational outcomes 
(Mizala and Romaguera, 2000a and 2002; Gallego, 
2002; Sapelli and Vial, 2002; García and Paredes, 
2009; Chumacero and Paredes, 2008). In line with the 
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international literature, they find that socio-economic 
variables significantly affect academic results. Thus, 
any analysis of education quality must consider the 
characteristics of students.2
Table 1 shows the results of  two regressions 
employing two different estimation techniques, ordinary 
least squares (ols) and hierarchical linear modelling 
(hlm). The use of a multilevel model that takes account 
of influences common to students at the same school 
reflects the possibility that observations may not be 
independent (Steenbergen and Bradford, 2002). In this 
model, academic attainment is represented by Yij and 
depends on a group of socio-demographic factors X 
(see equation 1) that specify level 1 (student) of the 
mixed effects model:
 Yij = β0j + β1Xij + εij (1)
The vector Xij contains a series of  student 
characteristics (sex, educational level of  mother 
and family income). The error εij is assumed to be 
independent and have an identical distribution N(0,σe2). 
Level 2 (school) is represented by equation (2):
 β0j = γ00 + γ01Cj + η0j (2)
2 For other studies, see Sapelli and Vial, 2002; Sapelli, 2003; Pavez, 
2004; García and Paredes, 2009.
where j indicates municipalities. The vector Cj 
contains school characteristics (e.g., rural location, 
school vulnerability index, average family incomes 
and average educational level of students’ mothers). 
The error η0j, which follows a distribution N(0,σ02), 
represents the portion of intercept that is not explained 
by the predictors at the school level and is supposedly 
independent of the predictors at the student level.
Both consider family income, parents’ schooling, 
gender, location (urban) and institutional dummies 
associated with the two types of municipal schools 
(“department” and “corporation”), taking subsidized 
private schools and direct school expenditure (question 
put to parents in the simce questionnaire) as the 
base.3 Reflecting the findings of most studies, table 
1 shows that all these variables have a significant 
impact on performance as measured by the simce test 
using both ols and hlm. Likewise, as in a number 
of other studies, both estimations show municipal 
schools performing more poorly than subsidized 
private schools, a difference that is particularly large 
in the case of municipal corporations.
3 At the beginning of the reform, a small number of municipalities 
chose to have a municipal corporation (corporación municipal) to 
manage schools. These corporations have a board and enjoy greater 
autonomy than a municipal department (dirección municipal). After 
a few years, the government decided not to give municipalities a 
choice of administration method. Most analysts suggest that the 
“random” way this option was introduced and withdrawn did not 
bias any student performance results. 
FIGURE 1
simcea scores by income group, 2003
Source: J.J. Brunner, “Experiencia internacional y desafíos nacionales de gestión escolar”, Santiago, Chile, Fundación Chile, 2005.
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There is a great deal of debate over this difference, 
however. The gap between private and municipal 
schools as estimated in table 1 requires more thorough 
analysis since, for example, the choice of school type 
is endogenous, biasing the estimates.4 Increasing the 
number of controls reduces the bias against municipal 
schools. In fact, controls such as “fixed school effects” 
and “selection variables”, for instance, could make this 
difference negligible (see, for example, Bellei, 2005; 
Contreras, Bustos and Sepúlveda, 2007).
Fortunately, one clear advantage of this study 
is that it is only concerned with municipal schools 
and therefore does not have to deal with the private/
municipal controversy. To answer the main question 
of this paper, we can work exclusively with municipal 
schools. This does not mean we cannot form some 
estimate of how restrictive the Teaching Statute is 
and what its effects on academic performance are, 
since the same employment regime affects each 
municipality differently depending on its exposure 
to the more restrictive aspects of the law. Thus, for 
instance, we can expect the effects to be more serious for 
municipalities with older teachers, since the Teaching 
Statute imposes greater conditions with age, and the 
restrictions will particularly affect those requiring 
greater flexibility.
4 See Hsieh and Urquiola (2006); Anand, Mizala and Repetto (2006); 
McEwan (2001); Contreras (2002); Sapelli and Vial (2002). 
TABLE 1
Fourth grade students: academic 
performance




Income (00.000) 0.35 0.21
(32.94)a (19.69)a










Municipal corporation –11.67 –9.45
(41.56)a (11.80)a
Father’s schooling 1.51 1.18
(44.46)a (36.29)a
Mother’s schooling 3.07 2.37
(85.39)a (67.65)a
Expenditure (00.000) 0.20 –0.55
(4.38)a (10.24)a
Observations 220 212 220 212
R2 0.20 0.19
Number of  groups  7 313
Source: estimates based on simce results, Ministry of Education.
N.B.: The robust t-statistic is given in parentheses.
a Significant at 1%.
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1. socio-economic and environmental variables
As already stated, a clear advantage of our procedure 
is that it does not require us to confront the private/
public controversy. We can focus our work by 
estimating educational performance equations for 
municipal schools only, and because the conclusions 
do not differ we shall report only the results for the 
ols estimations.
We first estimated a model incorporating the 
same type of sociodemographic variables as are used 
in table 1, but for municipal schools only. In view of 
what is done in most studies, we included the school 
vulnerability index estimated by the Ministry of 
Education, average schooling and average income in 
the municipal district as a sort of control for social 
capital. We then considered a set of variables associated 
with budgetary constraints affecting education in each 
municipal district. This was done because differences 
in municipal resources are very significant in Chile, 
with budgets depending heavily on the taxes levied by 
each municipality (chiefly property and motor vehicle 
taxes). The variable we used for this purpose was the 
expenditure per student notified by municipalities, 
which does not differentiate by funding source.
We also considered variables reflecting the basis 
of the education function that have been justified by 
different studies, such as the teacher-student ratio, the 
number of municipal schools within the municipal 
district, the number of registered students and coverage, 
as measures of scale.5 Furthermore, we considered 
the length of tenure of teaching staff  as measured by 
the payment of bienios, a teaching salary component 
based on experience (measured in two-year units) 
which is included in the salaries and wages account. 
This latter variable, which is essentially exogenous to 
each municipal district, reflects the extent to which 
the Teaching Statute affects salaries, since tenure is 
associated with different capabilities but also entails 
5 Coverage, which is notified by the municipalities, does not reflect 
the percentage of  young people in the municipal district who 
are studying, since some districts are net exporters and others 
net importers. Thus, the variable is more of a scale proxy than a 
coverage variable as such. We are grateful to the cepal Review 
referee for bringing this point to our attention. 
greater constraints and creates an obstacle to dismissal. 
Lastly, we included variables reflecting the distribution 
of expenditure between personnel, operating costs 
and investment.
Since the results of the regressions for each test are 
quite consistent, in table 2 we only report the results 
for average performance. From this table we can infer 
that, taken as a whole, the model is appropriate but 
has considerably less explanatory power than one 
covering all students. The relatively low R2 shows the 
huge dispersion between municipalities. For the whole 
sample, in any event, the sociodemographic variables 
have a significant impact on the scores obtained by 
students, a result that is consistent with the different 
studies carried out in Chile and internationally.6
Regarding municipal organization, the findings 
are quite striking. The results in the first column show 
that municipal schools run by municipal corporations 
do worse than those run by municipal departments, 
even though they have fewer institutional constraints. 
Evidently this absence of constraints may mean that 
resources are better channelled, but the data suggest that 
autonomy has also meant a greater diversion of efforts 
from education to other interests that could well be 
directly related to the evaluation of the mayor. However, 
interestingly enough, the introduction of municipal 
controls makes this difference disappear.7
The results also show that academic performance 
is affected by institutional constraints. Whilst the 
coefficients associated with sociodemographic variables 
remain statistically and economically important 
with the introduction of institutional controls, the 
coefficient associated with bienios, reflecting the 
ageing of teaching staff, is negative and significant. 
This means that we cannot rule out the existence of 
6 In addition to statistical importance, there needs to be a clear 
analysis of pedagogical relevance. We do not make the distinction 
in this paper; instead, we shall later analyse orders of magnitude 
compared with the estimated effects of other educational programmes 
on performance. 
7  Of course, the introduction of more and more controls may capture 
the difference between municipal corporations and departments. 
An analysis of  the specific elements behind the different ways 
municipalities manage education is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but is clearly a natural step. See García and Paredes (2009) for a 
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TABLE 2
Municipal schools: determinants of simce averages
(Ordinary least squares)
 Coefficient Beta Coefficient Beta
Constant 203.08  208.10  
(123.17)a  (62.65)a  
Income (00.000) 0.43 0.14 0.48 0.15
(22.02)a  (18.31)a  
Income 2 (00.000) –0.00000021 –0.10 –0.0000013 –0.10
(16.43)a  (14.57)a  
Gender 0.98 0.01 –0.04 0.00
(3.69)a  (0.10)  
Urban –10.45 –0.09 –8.71 –0.08
(24.06)a  (15.83)a  
Father’s education (mean) –0.05 0.05 0.29 0.02
(.36)  (1.56)  
Mother’s education (mean) 1.28 0.00 0.67 0.01
(8.94)a  (3.79)a  
Income (mean) 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.03
(6.13)a  (4.97)a  
Municipal corporation –4.47 –0.04 –0.95 –0.01
(15.30)a  (1.63)  
Coverage   13.15 0.05
  (8.44)a  
Number of  municipal schools   0.15 0.06
  (10.57)a  
Bienios payments (00.000)   –19.58 –0.03
  (9.38)a  
Expenditure per student   0.01 0.02
  (4.63)a  
Operating expenses (00.000)   0.00 0.00
  (0.33)  
Investment (00.000)   0.00 0.00
  (0.65)  
Students registered   0.86 0.00
  (0.53)  
Students per teacher   –0.43 –0.03
  (6.32)a  
Staff  expenses (00.000)   0.00 0.00
  (9.98)a (0.35)
Observations 121 693  72 629  
R2 0.10   0.11
Source: estimates based on simce results, Ministry of  Education, and municipal data, Department of  Regional and Administrative 
Development (subdere).
a Significant at 1%.
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two effects, but the data show the predominance of a 
negative effect. Thus, the competing hypotheses are: 
(i) there is a positive effect on students’ performance 
since teachers’ tenure is associated with greater 
experience and capabilities, and (ii) tenure can be 
associated with obsolescence, and is reflected in a 
larger proportion of teachers covered by the Teaching 
Statute. Municipalities have a variable proportion of 
teachers working on a contract basis and not subject 
to the statute, allowing replacements to be made with 
potentially positive incentivizing effects since effort 
is thereby encouraged and there is the prospect of a 
place on the permanent teaching staff.
2. Academic performance by municipality
Using the coefficients obtained from regressions 
like those in table 2, we can predict the performance 
of  students and hence of  municipal schools and 
municipalities. Consequently, the residual of  the 
equations should show the relative performance of 
each municipality. One problem with this approach, 
however, is that this residual may be associated not 
only with the true performance of each municipality, 
but also with the influence exerted by “other factors” 
which have not been considered and are not orthogonal 
to the variables taken.
We might argue that a ranking that could truly 
be associated with performance would have to be 
constructed from an equation that only considered 
sociodemographic factors and budgetary constraints 
as expressed in the variables included in table 2. Table 
3 shows three rankings, the first unconditional, the 
second conditional only upon sociodemographic factors 
and the third, in our opinion the correct one, also 
conditional upon budgetary factors. Table 3 presents 
results for only the 20 municipalities with the best and 
worst performance out of the whole sample of more 
than 300 municipalities. The “Unadjusted” columns 
show the simple difference between the effective average 
score by municipality and the national average. The 
“Adjusted for sociodemographic factors” column 
shows the residual from a regression that controls for 
sociodemographic factors and educational vulnerability 
elements and the “Adjusted for sociodemographic 
and municipal factors” column shows the residual of 
a regression that also controls for specific elements 
associated with the municipality, including municipal 
expenditure and bienios payments.
From this table it is clear that the adjusted and 
unadjusted rankings undergo very large changes 
once different types of  variables are controlled for. 
Some municipal districts move from near the top of 
the ranking to near the bottom, which suggests that 
vulnerability explains a large part of  the differences. 
However, more important than the precise ranking, 
which depends on the type of  variables included, 
is the fact that the variance in scores between 
municipalities is huge whichever ranking is taken. 
Thus, even after adjusting for sociodemographic 
differences and municipal constraints, there is a 
difference of  more than 100 points between the 
scores of  schools in the municipalities with the best 
and worst results and of  45 points between the top 
and bottom deciles of  municipalities.
3. Management
The estimated regression residuals shown in table 3 
are attributable to a set of “other factors”, and our 
hypothesis is that there are management elements 
among them. Management may affect performance 
in two ways. First, by making processes more efficient, 
it frees up a greater volume of resources to support 
teaching activities. Second, a significant part of 
management must consist in managing human resources 
and motivating student achievement.
If  management elements are in fact explanatory 
factors that are not considered in the equations used 
to construct the rankings in table 3, and if they are not 
orthogonal to the variables included, the estimations 
giving rise to the ranking are not consistent. In fact, 
it is possible that higher-income families are over-
represented in municipalities with better management, 
for instance. To capture the management effect, we used 
a number of indicators for administrative and teaching 
management collected by the sned system, which is 
geared towards rewarding better-run schools. Among 
the battery of variables considered, the literature on 
the issue has stressed the importance of a particular 
subset, namely: (i) the existence of a management 
team, (ii) the frequency with which the management 
team meets, (iii) teacher follow-up and evaluation,
(iv) the existence of programmes that involve training 
and development of  staff  capabilities, (v) annual 
planning, (vi) active involvement of  the parents’ 
association and the school community in management 
teams, (vii) acceptance of specific commitments by the 
school and (viii) disclosure to parents of information 
on performance test results (see, for example, Rivkin, 
Hanushek and Kain, 2001; Tokman, 2004; Bellei and 
González, 2002; Willms 2002; Pavez, 2004).
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TABLE 3
Municipalities ranking best and worst for academic performance
Unadjusted Adjusted for sociodemographic 
factors
Adjusted for sociodemographic 
and municipal factors
Top 20 municipalities
Providencia 49.42 Alto Hospicio 63.12 O’Higgins 66.62
Primavera 46.53 Mejillones 55.02 Corral 38.65
Viña del Mar 42.99 O’Higgins 50.56 Laguna Blanca 37.81
Las Condes 36.95 Isla de Pascua 42.68 Freirina 34.66
Ollagüe 36.82 Freirina 30.54 Andacollo 34.31
Licantén 34.12 Quilaco 28.9 La Higuera 30.92
Los Muermos 30.98 Corral 28.68 Sierra Gorda 30.66
Rinconada 30.83 Tocopilla 28.11 Huasco 29.57
Cabo de Hornos 30.19 Andacollo 27.81 Tocopilla 29.32
San Gregorio 28.13 Colchane 26.8 Chile Chico 29.15
Vichuquén 28.1 Lo Barnechea 26.19 Tucapel 28.33
Curaco de Vélez 27.35 La Higuera 25.01 Ollagüe 27.17
Ñuñoa 26.6 Caldera 24.97 San Gregorio 26.72
Purranque 26.45 Huasco 23.72 Caldera 23.51
Zapallar 26.26 Tucapel 22.82 Quilaco 22.87
Combarbalá 25.94 Calera 22.76 Natales 22.73
Alto Bío Bío 25.36 Calle Larga 22.71 Palena 22.49
San Fabián 24.23 Chillán Viejo 21.52 Lago Verde 22.43
Santo Domingo 23.03 Laguna Blanca 20.33 Pica 20.95
Juan Fernández 22.97 Los Vilos 20.01 Maullín 20.41
      
Bottom 20 municipalities
Santa Juana –22.89 Pumanque –22.73 Puqueldón –15.49
Laguna Blanca –22.9 Combarbalá –22.98 Algarrobo –16.33
San Antonio –23.61 Curanilahue –23.71 La Cisterna –16.57
Nogales –24.24 Castro –24.19 Hijuelas –17.32
Marfil –24.47 Pelluhue –24.47 Palmilla –17.79
Chillán Viejo –24.88 Puqueldón –24.77 Llanquihue –19.02
Calera –26.63 Treguaco –24.98 Placilla –20.43
La Higuera –28.15 Primavera –26 Paillaco –20.54
Lo Barnechea –28.54 General Lagos –26.43 Quemchi –21.4
Tucapel –29.25 Quillón –26.44 Melipeuco –21.95
Corral –30.29 Fresia –26.88 Teno –23.92
Freirina –32.14 Vichuquén –28.96 Hualañé –24.63
Camarones –36.16 Traiguén –29.41 Fresia –26.39
Colchane –39.65 Hualañe –29.63 Vichuquén –26.84
Mejillones –40.11 Curaco Velez –30.58 Traiguén –28.52
Andacollo –40.78 Licantén –34.79 Trehuaco –29.2
Quilaco –45.27 Rinconada –40.15 Licantén –38.98
Cholchol –46.71 Purranque –44.28 Rinconada –45.38
O’Higgins –53.99 Alto Bío Bío –46.57 Alto Bío Bío –46.11
Alto Hospicio –66.18 Los Muermos –51.28 Los Muermos –51.67
Source: rankings using estimates based on simce results, Ministry of  Education, and municipal data, Department of  Regional and 
Administrative Development (subdere).
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We measured the effect of  these variables 
by re-estimating the equations but bringing in 
management variables at this stage. One of the main 
problems with these variables is that they have very 
low variance between municipalities. This is largely 
because municipalities may be entitled to monetary 
incentives that depend on the results of these variables. 
Consequently, variables like “having a management 
team” that are basically self-reported are positive 
in over 90% of  municipalities. A second problem 
is the possibly endogenous nature of the variables. 
To deal with this, we experimented with the use of 
instrumental variables. We did not find significantly 
different results so, once again, only ols results are 
reported. The findings presented in table 4 show that 
having a management team, having this team meet 
occasionally or with high frequency, developing 
teachers’ capabilities and disclosing simce results to 
parents are variables which are not only statistically 
significant but have an economically important impact 
on school performance.
Table 5 shows the rankings of the 20 best and worst 
municipalities in this aspect of  performance and the 
last column shows the contribution of  management 
factors on the assumption that management variables 
are orthogonal to socio-economic and budgetary 
variables. If  this assumption is correct, management 
elements as measured by the sned are indeed very 
important, which suggests that other management 
variables besides those included in the sned may 
be critical.
Table 5 also shows that the order of magnitude 
of  the difference between the municipalities with 
the best and worst average performance associated 
with factors that are neither sociodemographic nor 
associated with budgets or “measured management” 
is about 50 points, i.e., one standard deviation in 
the simce (second column). This in turn is about 
nine times the effect that has been attributed to the 
complete school day initiative, which is costing half  
a point of gdp.
TABLE 4
Municipal schools: simce determinants with 
management variables
(Ordinary least squares)
 Ministry of 
Education Beta
Constant 195,35  
(46,04)a  
Income (00.000) 0,46 0,14(16,34)a  
Income 2 (00.000) 0,00 –0,10(12,53)a  
Gender 0,43 0,00(1,18)  
Urban –10,16 –0,08(16,63)a  
Father’s education (mean) 0,41 0,01(2,07)b  
Mother’s education (mean) 0,04 0,00(0,19)  
Income (mean) 0,18 0,03(4,30)a  
Municipal corporation –1,00 –0,01(1,59)  
Coverage 15,75 0,06(9,33)a  
Students per teacher –0,55 –0,03(7,32)a  
Bienios payments (00.000) –20,09 –0,04(8,96)a
Number of municipal schools 0,14 0,05(8,65)a
Registered students 4,83 –0,02(2,76)a
Staff expenses (00.000) 0,00 –0,07(8,31)b
Operating expenses (00.000) 0,00 –0,01(0,75)
Investment (00.000) 0,00 0,02(3,43)
Management team 3,84 0,02(4,26)a
Teacher evaluation 3,80 0,04(9,87)
Parental involvement 1,68 0,01
(2,28)a
Annual planning 7,06 0,01
(4,05)a
Community involvement 7,13 0,02
(6,39)a  





Source: simce and sned, Ministry of Education and Department 
of  Regional and Administrative Development (subdere).
a Significant at 1%.
b Significant at 5%.
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TABLE 5







O’Higgins 66.62 Corral 47.15 Río Hurtado 27.63
Corral 38.65 Lago Verde 44.38 Graneros 17.29
Laguna Blanca 37.81 Sierra Gorda 37.99 Los Sauces 15.95
Freirina 34.66 La Higuera 35.07 Perquenco 14.93
Andacollo 34.31 Andacollo 34.47 Santo Domingo 13.44
La Higuera 30.92 Freirina 30.86 Antuco 10.17
Sierra Gorda 30.66 Huasco 29.24 Padre las Casas 9.37
Huasco 29.57 Maullín 28.68 La Cruz 8.80
Tocopilla 29.32 Tocopilla 27.30 Ercilla 8.64
Chile Chico 29.15 Tucapel 26.64 Puqueldón 8.37
Tucapel 28.33 Natales 25.34 Alto Bío Bío 7.67
Ollagüe 27.17 Santa Juana 24.79 Pelarco 7.52
San Gregorio 26.72 Palena 24.36 Pemuco 7.40
Caldera 23.51 Chillán Viejo 23.09 Monte Patria 7.16
Quilaco 22.87 Chile Chico 22.7 Quirihue 7.16
Natales 22.73 Cholchol 22.27 San José de la Mariquina 7.08
Palena 22.49 Caldera 21.39 Coinco 7.00
Lago Verde 22.43 Río Ibáñez 21.23 Lautaro 6.62
Pica 20.95 Cabildo 20.94 Chile Chico 6.44
Maullín 20.41 Calera 19.69 Marchigüe 5.96
      
Bottom 20 municipalities
Puqueldón –15.49 Vichuquén –18.13 San Nicolás –5.60
Algarrobo –16.33 Palmilla –18.56 Parral –5.82
La Cisterna –16.57 Llanquihue –19.32 Yerbas Buenas –6.08
Hijuelas –17.32 Hualañé –20.86 Pirque –6.13
Palmilla –17.79 Placilla –21.11 Retiro –6.27
Llanquihue –19.02 Teno –21.56 Cabildo –6.28
Placilla –20.43 Perquenco –21.57 Doñihue –6.45
Paillaco –20.54 Quemchi –21.94 Malipeuco –6.67
Quemchi –21.40 Santo Domingo –22.00 Sierra Gorda –7.33
Melipeuco –21.95 Padre las Casas –22.83 Empedrado –7.48
Teno –23.92 Puqueldón –23.86 El Carmen –7.70
Hualañé –24.63 Los Sauces –25.08 Maullín –8.27
Fresia –26.39 Paillaco –25.75 Corral –8.50
Vichuquén –26.84 Río Hurtado –25.79 Vichuquén –8.71
Traiguén –28.52 Fresia –27.56 Santa Juana –11.09
Treguaco –29.20 Traiguén –29.27 San Pablo –11.44
Licantén –38.98 Rinconada –29.97 Chonchi –12.64
Rinconada –45.38 Treguaco –31.23 Hualaihué –13.46
Alto Bío Bío –46.11 Alto Bío Bío –53.79 Rinconada –15.42
Los Muermos –51.67 Los Muermos –57.23 Lago Verde –21.96
Source: authors’ calculations based on ols estimates.
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Educational outcomes in Chile are extremely poor 
by international standards, especially considering 
the economic effort made over the last 20 years 
and the important role of  education quality in the 
inequity of  income distribution. One of  the reasons 
for this lies in the poor performance of  municipal 
schools, where teachers are subject to a very rigid 
employment regime.
We analysed the effects of this rigid employment 
regime on academic performance within the context of 
municipal schools and concluded that sociodemographic 
factors explained most of the variance in municipal 
schools’ performance. We also showed, however, 
that the employment regime adversely affected those 
schools. Security of tenure for teaching staff  is the 
most important variable associated with the system’s 
operability and has a very adverse effect on school 
performance. Nonetheless, this factor is not the main 
reason for municipal schools’ poor performance. In 
fact, the results suggest that differences ascribable 
exclusively to management, measured using simple 
indicators monitored by the sned programme, have the 
most significant effect in accounting for the variation 
in school performance between municipalities.
 The fact that the differences in the average scores 
of the 20 best- and worst-performing municipalities, 
respectively, are some three times as great as those 
attributable to the complete school day initiative, a 
programme requiring the investment of half a point of 
gdp, suggests that poor academic performance in Chile 
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